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May 1954] CITY OF Los ANGELEs v. BELRIDGE OrL Co. 823 
[42 C.2d 823; 271 P.2d 5] 
[L. A. No. 22586. In Bank. May 
CITY OF LOS ANGEI1ES, Appellant, v. BELl~IDGE OIL 
COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent. 
[1] Licenses-Construction of License Laws.-While license tax 
laws are to be construed against municipality and in favor of 
taxpayer, it is fundamental that judicial construction should 
be in keeping with natural and probable legislative purpose, 
avoid conflict, and harmonize all applicable provisions of law 
on subject, if possible. 
[2] !d.-Construction of License Laws.-Where problem involves 
construction of particular section of a taxing ordinance, ordi-
nance should be looked to in its entirety and its provisions 
construed together. 
[3] !d.-Construction of License Laws.-A city ordinance section 
imposing a license tax on those "manufacturing and selling" 
or "selling" goods at wholesale, not specifically licensed by 
other sections of ordinance, was intended to cover all businesses 
engaged in selling goods at wholesale in city regardless of 
whether they are engaged in "manufacturing and selling" or 
merely "selling"; it is immaterial that the goods sold are pro-
duced in remote areas, whether they are produced in a com-
pany owned plant or purchased from an independent pro-
ducer, or whether selling is a small or major part of total 
effort. 
[4] !d.-Construction of License Laws.-In city ordinance impos-
ing a license tax on those "manufacturing and selling" or 
"selling" goods at wholesale, the term "selling" may not be 
construed to mean only selling of a merchandising nature, 
where there is no requirement that seller must be in merchan-
dising business before transaction can be called a sale, and 
where another part of ordinance provides that phrase "selling 
goods, wares and merchandise" shall include persons engaged 
in "fabricating, serving or supplying" goods for a price. 
[5] !d.-Construction of License Laws.-A corporation engaged in 
producing crude oil and natural gas from wells outside county 
is subject to provisions of city ordinance imposing a license 
tax on those engaged in "selling goods, wares or merchandise 
at wholesale" within city, where gross receipts of corporation 
are derived from sale of such merchandise, most negotiations 
for these sales were conducted through corporation's city office, 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Licenses, § 5; Am.Jur., Licenses, § 4 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-6] Licenses,§ 16; [7-9] Licenses,§ 9; 
[10 J Constituional Law, § 48; [11, 12] J_,icenses, § 59 (2). 
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all contracts were 
for all sales is 
[6] !d.-Construction 
sold never entered 




[7] Id.- Power to License or Tax- Territorial Limitations.-
Where business license tax to be collected is a privilege 
tax exacted for of of "selling" 
and this activity takes within tax may be 
measured by the gross receipts therefrom some of them 
are attributable to extraterritorial such as produc-
tion and delivery of since such activity can constitu-
tionally be taxed even though goods never enter its 
territorial limits. 
[8] Id.- Power to License or Tax- Territorial Limitations.-
Where ordinance imposes license tax on those engaged in ac-
tivity of selling in city, city can only base tax on such selling 
activities as are carried out within its territorial limits; gross 
receipts attributable to selling activities conducted outside 
city should not be included. 
[9] Id.-Power to License or Tax- Territorial Limitations.-To 
allow a city to levy a license tax based on gross receipts 
attributable to selling activities outside city would be an un-
reasonable discrimination and a denial of equal protection of 
the law. 
[10] Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of Statutes-Construc-
tion.-Where a statute or ordinance is susceptible of two con-
structions, one of which will render it constitutional and the 
other unconstitutional in whole or in part, court will adopt 
construction which, without doing violence to reasonable mean-
ing of language used, will render it valid in its entirety or free 
from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the other 
construction is equally reasonable. 
[11] Licenses-Enforcement of License Tax-Limitation of Ac-
tions.-City's cause of action for recovery of business license 
taxes is governed by three-year statute of limitations applicable 
to "an action upon a created by statute, other than 
a penalty or forfeiture" (Code Civ. § 338, subd. 1), and 
four-year period Code Civ. § 343, for an 
action for relief not otherwise for by statute, cannot 
apply. 
[10] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional 
Constitutional Law, § 96 et seq. 
§ 61 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
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[12] !d.-Enforcement of License Tax-Limitation of Actions.-
Three-year period of limitation of Code Civ. Proc., § 338, 
subd. 1, which is applicable to city's cause of action for re-
covery of business license taxes, runs from time cause of action 
accrues, which is when tax becomes delinquent. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Roy L. Herndon, ,Judge. Reversed. 
Action to recover license taxes. Judgment for defendant 
reversed. 
Ray L. Chesebro and Roger Arnebergh, City Attorneys, 
Bourke Jones, Assistant City Attorney, and ,James A. Doherty, 
Deputy City Attorney, for Appellant. 
Wellborn, Barrett & Rocli, Vernon Barrett and F. C. L. 
Head for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment in an 
action to recover business license taxes from the defendant. 
All the facts were stipulated to, and each party moved for 
summary judgment. The motion of defendant company was 
granted. 
By its complaint in this action plaintiff sought a judgment 
in the amount of $9,768.30 as unpaid business license taxes 
owing for the years 1948-1950, inclusive. 'l'his claim is based 
on the ground that plaintiff has a right, under the provisions 
of section 21.166 of the Los Angeles City Tax Ordinance. 
to impose a business license tax on defendant measured by the 
company's gross receipts. Section 21.166 provides that 
'' Every person manufacturing and selling any goods, wares 
or merchandise at wholesale, or selling goods, wares or mer-
chandise at wholesale, and not otherwise specifically licensed 
by other provisions of this Article, shall pay for each calendar 
year, or portion thereof, the sum of $8.00 for the first $20,000, 
or less, of gross receipts, and, in addition . . . '' 
Defendant company is engaged in the production and sale 
of crude oil and natural gas. All of its wells are located 
in Kern County. which is the scene of all productive opera-
tions. The field office of the defendant is located in Kern 
County while the main office is situated in the ci.ty of Los 
Angeles. Its various products which are marketed under long-
term contracts, are delivered to the purchasers directly at the 
field plants and never enter the territorial limits of the city 
of Los Angeles. 
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The board of directors of defendant company meets in 
Los Angeles, most of the company's banking is done in Los 
Angeles and the corporate officers spend the major portion of 
their time at the main office in Los Angeles. Negotiations for 
the sale of defendant's products are conducted in part at the 
main office, in part at the offices of purchasers and in part by 
mail, telegraph or telephone communications between the de-
fendant's main office in Los Angeles and the customer. De-
fendant company signs all contracts at its main office. 
All obligations, including payrolls, are paid from the head 
office except emergency wage payments and disbursements 
for miscellaneous items, which are paid from a checking ac-
count in Bakersfield carrying an average balance of between 
$2,000 and $3,000. The main office makes all purchases, except 
those of an emergency nature, and payment for the sales of all 
items sold by defendant are received from purchasers at the 
main office and deposited in Los Angeles bank accounts. Based 
upon these facts the plaintiff city takes the position that the 
defendant company is engaged in selling in the city of Los 
Angeles the oil and gas it produces in Kern County, and that 
it is therefore subject to the tax provided for in section 21.166 
of the Los Angeles city tax ordinance. 
Defendant's theory of the case is that the company's opera-
tions are not such as to make it taxable under the provisions 
of section 21.166, and that even if that section is applicable, 
plaintiff city has no constitutional right to levy a tax under 
its provisions based on defendant's total gross receipts. De-
fendant also contends that the city's right to a recovery for 
the year 1948 is barred by the applicable limitation pro-
visions of section 338, subdivision 1, of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. 
In substance the principal problem presented is one of con-
struction-construction as to the scope and intended purview 
of section 21.166 of the l.Jos Angeles tax ordinance. Plaintiff 
city contends that defendant company is a person selling 
goods, wares and merchandise at wholesale within the meaning 
of section 21.166. Defendant company claims that it is not. 
Defendant argues that section 21.166 covers two types of 
businesses. 'fhose which are engaged in the "manufacturing 
and selling" of goods, wares or merchandise at wholesale and 
those which are engaged in ''selling'' of goods, wares or 
merchandise at wholesale. 'rhis contention is based upon the 
ground that if "selling" by its own force includes "maml-
facturing and selling'' there would have been no reason to 
separately mention "manufacturing and selling." In view of 
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tllis language, ~efen~nt argu~s thattne tebn 'fselli1tg-" is 
n~t .. int~nded toinciudeHlrlall,1lfacturing and selling" a;nd 
therefore it ne~essarily follows that the term ''~rellil'lg" .was 
not intended to include such. activities as «:producing .and 
selling"or Hmining andselling~" Based upon this. preDlise, 
dt.lfend~nt .co11cludes that the inference is clear that the te:rm 
"s~Iling'' is o11ly intended to cover businesses of a merchan-
dising natl1re,. 'Yhere .. selling, rather tha!l. the 'Creation or 
Ca);!tnre of somethin,g tQ sell, is the essence of the ente,rprise; 
a11d therefore since the dominant portion of defendant's ~11si~ 
ness is the capture ofso:tn.ething to .sell, section 21.166 i,s not 
appli~ble. . . .. ·. . .. . .. .. . ...•. 
There. seems to be no do11bt that. the defendantcompff,ily 
~as.engaged .in.selling, since a company whichderiyes several 
million .dollars. a year from tl}e sale of .petroleum products 
is 9bvi?1lsly engaged in· selling those prmiucts; . Jl:oweyer, we 
~till hay~ .the.· pro})lem of whether .the defendant .. c?mpau:r 
yvas;a.:person ''selling'' within the meaning .of.section 21.166 . 
. [lJ . In analyzing thE} scope and :neaiJing of a tax ordinance 
o.f.this type, we are aware that tax laws .are to b~ c()nstr1led 
as-aillst. th~ municipality and in favor 0~ .. the taxpayer, buf}t 
:tutH'It ~o be ;remembered that such a rule does not take 
precedence oyer ot'!ler fundamental rules of statutory. eon~ 
.~traction, .. It is fundamental th~t H~udicial construeti1:1n 
sh(.lttld be i11 keeph1g V~Tiththe natural ap.d probable legislative. 
p"(lrp.os;e, anCI. avoid cohl}:ict,. f1nd hf),rmonize all .the. applicable 
pl'~Visio!ls of the laW'onthe srd>jeet if .possible." (MeQuillin1 
Mup.icip~L Corp(jrations, 3d ea., voL .16,·Taxation,. ··~ 44.12.) 
~J · .. A.l~o where the problem involves the eonstl'uetion of a paf~ 
fieul~rsecti~n or a tanllS' ordinance, the o;rdinalJ.ee.sholl,ld be 
looke~ to i:u its e!ltir~ty ana its provisions constru~d. together~ 
(Hfatnma'f(, v. Oity ~!'Alameda, 162 Cal.. 648. [124.P. ~a}:) 
•. In .the ease at< bar, th,e sectimi··inquestion. (21,16~) ts·. bu.t 
~ne s~all J)a;J_'t. of • Ordina;nee No. · 77,000 .. whiCh. is .~he licen~e 
ordinan~e ~f the city-of Los Arigeles. ·• Considering th~ ordi" 
n~;nc~ a~ a whole, we. :find .that jt · ~ont~ins various int~oduo.; 
t(:jr! secti~n~ ~overi11g SU<(h it~ms as definitions~ int~rpr~ta• · 
til)'~. e:tlfo:t;'e(lll1ent, .. P¥na1tiesl and··Iieense transfers, .f~ll(}W~d 
by a ~eat :nan:r sections settin~ out the tax lialiility of spec~~ 
b~s~I1ess enterprises< stwh as J;l.otels,lautldrys, th~atel's, 6U 
~el~s locat~d :in the ~ity ofLos .Angeles: etc. .Asi4~ f~e:m 
tM .se~tio!l.,s ref;errifi~ t~ !!Pecifie. b~iness?s, the ordinance con-
tajn~Jlrree ~o-~8,lled H cateb.-alP' sections: Section 21.166 }>ro~ 
Vide~ that '':Elvery person. :rn.anufactuHng and selling any 
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goods, wares, or merchandise at wholesale, or selling goods, 
wares, or merchandise at wholesale, and not otherwise specifi-
cally licensed by other provisions of this Article, shall pay ; 
... "; section 21.167 covers those who manufacture and sell 
or sell goods at retail and who are not licensed by other pro-
visions; and section 21.190 provides that ''Every person en-
gaged in any trade, calling, occupation, vocation, profession 
or other means of livelihood, as an independent contractor 
and not as an employee of another, and not specifically licensed 
by other provisions of this Article, shall pay .... " -While 
these other sections are not in issue here, a study of their 
provisions and of the ordinance as a whole is helpful in con-
struing the intended scope and meaning of section 21.166. 
An analysis of the ordinance in its entirety makes it 
apparent that even though several hundred types of businesses 
are specifically provided for it is almost impossible to cover 
each and every type of business by a specific section. For 
this reason the legislative body found it expedient to include 
three "catch-all" sections which were intended to cover those 
business enterprises not specifically taxed by the other sec-
tions. Such "catch-all" provisions are not considered too 
vague and theyhave been upheld by the courts. (City of Los 
Angeles v. Rancho Homes, Inc., 40 Cal.2d 764 [256 P.2d 305] .) 
There can be no doubt that the legislative body intended 
the "catch-all" sections to be sufficiently broad to cover all 
business enterprises not licensed under other sections of the 
ordinance. \Vith this purpose in mind it is obvious that the 
language used in eaeh of the three "catch-all" sections was 
intended to be such as would cover a wide range of activities. 
Our problem here is to determine whether the language of one 
of these "catch -all" sections, section 21.166, is sufficiently 
broad to include the business operations of defendant company. 
[3] Keeping in mind the broad scope and purpose of 
section 21.166 it becomes apparent that it was intended to 
coyer all businesses engaged in manufacturing and selling at 
wholesale in the city and also those businesses which merely 
engaged in selling at wholesale in the city. Thus all businesses 
which are engaged in selling goods, ·wares or merchandise at 
wholesale in the city of lJOS Angeles and which are not licensed 
by other sections of the ordinance come within section 21.166. 
This is trne regar(Uess of whether they arc engaged in "manu-
facturing and selling" or merely "selling." The important 
thing is that they are engaged in selling within the city of 
Jjos Angeles. If they are so engaged, all gross receipts attribu-
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table to selling in the city of Los Angeles are subject to 
the business license tax provided for by section 21.166. The 
fact that the goods sold are produced in remote areas is 
unimportant. It is algo immaterial whether they are produced 
in a company owned plant or purchased from an independent 
producer. The important thing is that the taxpayer is engaged 
in selling goods at wholesale in the city of Los Angeles. 
Section 21.166 of the tax ordinance was meant to cover 
those businesses, not covered by other sections, which are 
engaged in selling goods at wholesale in the city. It is so 
worded to include those who manufacture and sell as well as 
those who merely sell in the city. 'rhe fact that an organization 
is engaged in selling in the city is sufficient and it is of no 
import that selling is but a small part of the total effort or 
that selling is not difficult for the instant company. There 
is no reason to believe tbat the authors of section 21.166 were 
concerned with the degree of effort or expense involved in the 
selling of goods nor were they concerned with whether or 
not selling >vas the dominant or incidental activity of the 
company. The main concern would appear to be whether 
or not the company was engaged in the selling of goods. The 
purpose of the section was to place a business license tax on 
those activities which took place within the city of Los Angeles 
regardless of their relationship to activities outside the city. 
[4] The defendant company has argued that the term 
''selling'' was not intended to include other elements such as 
"producing and selling" or "mining and selling," but rather 
that it could only mean selling of a merchandising nature. 
Such argument seeks to narrow the meaning of the words used 
to the point of actually destroying the general purpose of 
a "catch-all" section. The sale of goods is defined in section 
1721(2) of our Civil Code as "an agreement whereby the 
seller transfers the property in goods to the buyer for a con-
sideration called the price." There is no requirement that 
the seller must be in the merchandising business before thr 
transaction can be called a sale and likewise it is not logical 
to attempt to narrow the meaning of the term "selling" to 
include only those whose dominant business is of a merchan-
dising nature. 
There is nothing in section 21J 66 or anywhere in the entire 
taxing ordinance indicating that the word "se1ling" was only 
meant to include businesses where selling was the dominant 
part of a taxpayer's business. On the contrary section 21.08 ( t) 
of the Los Angeles tax ordinance provides that ''The phrase 
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'selling goods, wares and merchandise' shall, in addition to 
any other meaning established at law, be deemed to extend 
to and include in its application persons who engage in the 
business of fabricating, serving or supplying, for a price, 
tangible personal property furnished, produced or made at 
the special order of purehasers or eonsumers, or for purehasers 
or eonsumers who do or do not furnish, directly or indirectly, 
th\~ specifications therefor." 1'hns the business of "selling" 
ineludes not only those bm;inesses where merehandising is the 
dominant element but also those businesses whieh are engaged 
in "fabrieating, serving or supplying" goods for a price. 
[5] In the case at bar defendant company, being a cor-
poration, is a person as defined in section 21.08 (p) of the Los 
Angeles tax ordinance. The petroleum products with which 
it deals are considered in the nature of merchandise (West v. 
Kansas 1Yatt1ral Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 [31 S.Ct. 564, 55 L.Ed. 
716]) and the gross receipts of defendant company are derived 
from the sale of snch mel'chandise. Most negotiations for these 
!'ales were conducted through the defendant's Los Angeles 
office and all the contracts were signed by defendant in Los 
Angeles. Also payment for all sales is received from pur-
ehasers at the Los Angeles office. These faetors along with 
the other stipulate(} facts make it apparent that defendant's 
IJOS Angeles ofi1ce was engaged in the activity of "selling 
goods, wares or men~hamlise at wholesale'' within the city of 
Los Angeles and '''aR therefore subject to the provisions of 
section 21.166 of the Los Angeles tax ordinance. 
[6] The mere fact that the products sold never entered the 
city of Los Angeles does not prevent the selling activities 
from taking place in I1os Angeles. (McGoldrick v. Berwind-
Wh?'te Coal Min. Co., 309 U.S. 33 [60 S.Ct. 388, 84 L.Ed. 565, 
128 A.L.R. 876].) The business license tax in question here, 
is based on the fact that the selling activity is carried on within 
the city and it is immaterial where the products are produced 
or delivered. In the 1953 case of Keystone Metal Co. v. Pitts-
burgh, 374 Pa. 323 [97 A.2d 797], the sales transaction was 
consummated in Pittsburgh but the goods were shipped from 
a point outside Pennsylvania to a plant in New Jersey. The 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the receipts of 
such sale should be illclmled in the measure of the city of Pitts-
burgh's license tax, based on gross receipts. The court held 
that the selling activities within the city were sufficient to 
sustain imposition of the tax even though delivery and passage 
of title took place outside the city. 
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Defendant co.mpany also contends that even if section 21.166 
is applicable, the city cannot constitutionally tax the total 
gross receipts of the company since such would be an attempt 
to impose a tax on business carried on outside the city. This 
argument is based on the ground that since the total gross 
receipts include the proceeds of products produced and deliv-
ered outside the city the effect would be to allow a city to tax 
transactions occurring outside its boundaries. This argument 
seems to lose sight of the nature of section 21.166. 
[7] The business license tax here sought to be collected 
is a privilege tax, exacted for the privilege of engaging in 
the activity of "selling." \Vhen this activity takes place 
within the city, the rate of tax may be measured by the gross 
receipts derived therefrom. (Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. City of 
Los Angeles, 53 Cal.App.2d 825, 830 [128 P.2d 408] .) As 
stated by this court in ~Martin Ship Service Co. v. City of Los 
Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 793, 796 [215 P.2d 24], "In view of the 
recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court in 
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 [68 S.Ct. 1475, 
92 L.Ed. 1832], and Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 
334 U.S. 653 [68 S.Ct. 1260, 92 L.Ed. 1633], the city may 
clearly tax plaintiffs' local activities and the gross receipts 
therefrom.'' In the case at bar it is true that some of 
these gross receipts are attributable to extraterritorial ele-
ments such as the production and delivery of the goods. 
However, there is no constitutional objection to resorting to 
extraterritorial elements in determining the rate of tax. (Great 
Atlant?:c & Pac. Tea Co. v. GrosJean, 301 U.S. 412 [57 S.Ct. 772, 
81 L.Ed. 1193, 112 A.L.R. 293] ; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 
525 [ 40 S.Ct. 2, 63 L.Ed. 1124] ; Cedar Hills Cemetery Corp. 
v. DistTict of Col~rrnbia, 124 F .2d 286.) The activity being 
taxed here is the activity of selling and such activity can be 
taxed by the city even though the goods never enter its terri-
torial limits. (Il eystone Metal Co. v. P1:ttsburgh, supm, 97 
A.2d 797.) 
In the instant case we can find no objection, constitutional 
or otherwise, to the imposition of a business license tax on the 
privilege of engaging in selling activities within the city. 
Likewise there is no objection to basing the rate of such tax 
on the gross receipts attributable to such selling activities, 
even though various extraterritorial events contribute to 
such gross receipts. [8] There is, however, one important 
limitation which should be pointed out and that is this: even 
though the city can tax the activity of selling it can only 
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base the tax on such selling activities as are carried out within 
its territorial limits. For this reason it is only those gross 
receipts which are attributable to selling activities within 
the city which should form the basis for the rate of tax. Gross 
receipts attributable to selling activities conducted outside the 
city should not be included. Such a construction necessarily 
follows from the fact that the business license tax is on the 
privilege of engaging in selling activities in the city of Los 
Angeles and as such should only be based upon such activities. 
In the case of Gotlieb v. City of Birmingham, 243 Ala. 579 
[ 11 So.2d 363], the city ordinance imposed a tax on "each 
packing house'' and on persons ''soliciting or selling packing 
house products.'' In construing the scope of this city ordi-
nance the court held that in computing the license tax, based 
upon gross receipts, sales outside the territorial limits of the 
city should not be included. In City.of Sedalia v. Shell Petro-
le~~m Corp. (C.C.A. 8th, 1936), 81 :F'.2d 193 [106 A.L.R. 1327], 
a city license tax on persons engaged in the business of selling 
gasoline, based on the number of gallons sold, was held to be 
inapplicable to sales made outside the city. The court at page 
196 stated that ''there is a presumption that the governing 
body of the city was legislating with reference to the conduct 
of business within the territorial limits of the city, and there 
is nothing in the provision of the ordinances indicating that 
it was the intention to give them extraterritorial effect." 
[9] To allow a city to levy a license tax based upon gross 
receipts attributable to selling activities outside the city would 
be an unreasonable discrimination and a denial of equal pro-
tection of the law. (See Ferran v. City of Palo .Alto, 50 Cal. 
App.2d 374 [122 P.2d 965] .) If such taxation were allowed it 
would unjustly discriminate against those firms whose selling 
activities in Los Angeles compose but a small fraction of the 
total sales effort and whose gross receipts are in large part 
attributable to selling activities in other areas. [10] As 
stated in Franklin v. Peterson, 87 Cal.App.2d 727, 730 [197 
P.2d 788], "It is the rule that where a statute or ordinance 
is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render 
it constitutional and the other unconstitutional, in whole or in 
part, the court will adopt the construction which, without 
doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, 
will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to 
its constitutionality, even though the other construction is 
equally reasonable. The rule is based on the presumption 
that the legislative body intended not to violate the Constitu-
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tion, hut to make a valid statute or ordinance within the scope 
of its constitutional powers.'' ln the instant case a just and 
reasonable eonstruction rPquires that the measure of the tax 
be limited to thosn gross reeeipts attribt1table to selling activi-
ties within the of I,os Angeles. 
It is also contended, by defendant company, that the plain-
tiff city's cause of action for the recovery of 1948 taxes is 
barred by subdivision 1 of section 338 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. Defendant had previously taken the position, 
in the trial court, that the two-year limitation of section 339, 
subdivision 1 (Code Civ. Proc.) might also be applicable but 
in their appeal this view has been abandoned. Plaintiff argues 
that the four-year period of section 343 is applicable, and it 
therefore becomes necessary to determine whether the limita-
tion period on the city's cause of action for taxes is governed 
by the provisions of section 338, subdivision 1, or by the 
provisions of section 343. 
[11] Section 343 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides 
that ''An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for must 
be commenced within four years after the cause of action 
shall have accrued.'' In view of this wording section 343 can 
only apply if no limitation period for the instant action is 
provided for in the previous sections. Defendant company 
contends that the instant cause of action by the city for taxes 
comes within the limitation period of previous section 338, 
subdivision 1, and therefore section 343 cannot apply. We 
are inclined to agree. 
The three-year limitation period of section 338, subdivision 
1, which is applicable to ''an action upon a liability created 
by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture,'' adequately 
covers the instant cause. 
It is true that section 338, subdivision 1, purports to cover 
only those liabilities created by statute, but in King Mfg. Co. v. 
Augusta, 277 U.S. 100 [48 S.Ct. 489, 72 L.Ed. 801], the 
Supreme Court of the United States construed the word statute 
as including municipal ordinances. Thus by the direct ap-
proach of construction it would be possible to say that the 
instant license tax was a liability created by statute. It is also 
possible to reach the same result by the indirect method since 
we find that a liability created by statute is a liability which 
would not exist but for a statute. (Fidelity & Deposit Co. of 
Maryland v. Lindholm (C.C.A. 9th, 1933), 66 F.2d 56, 58 [89 
A.L.R. 279] .) In the instant case the city license tax, though 
42 C.2d-27 
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(:reatcr1 in the final instance the license ordinance could not 
lm vP existed but for the pcrwer to the city by the state 
Constitution and statutes. This is true since "[m]unicipal 
have no inherent power of taxation. On the 
pm;;;ess with respect thereto such power 
to them the constitution or statute. 
3rd Ed., Vol. 16, 
§ 44.05.) of 70 Ohio .App. 337 
[ 46 N.E.2d 325], it was held that the liability of a city to 
pay a policeman's salary, which was provided for by city 
ordinance as authorized by state statutes, was a liability 
created by statute. Heasoning from this basis the Ohio court 
held that the action for the recovery of such salary was barred 
by the provisions of the limitation statute dealing with lia-
bilities created by statute. Regardless of whether we prefer 
this indirect approach or the direct approach of construing 
the word statute to include ordinance, the inevitable conclu-
sion is that the liability in question was created by statute and 
therefore the limitation period of section 338, subdivision 1, 
is applicable. 
In the case at bar the three-year period of limitation 
of section 338, subchvision 1, which is applicable, runs from the 
time the rause of action accrues, and the cause of action accrues 
~when the tax becomcfl delinquent. Since the tax due under sec-
tion 21.166 must be paid before the close of business on the last 
day of Pebruary of each year (sections 21.20 and 21.24.1 of the 
Los .Angeles Tax Ordinance), the tax for the year 1948 was 
delinquent on March 1, 1948. The three-year limitation period 
which began to run from this date expired on March 1, 1951, 
which was prior to the filing of the complaint by plaintiff 
city, and, therefore, the city's cause of action for recovery of 
the 1948 tax is barred. 
\Ve hold, therefore, that the defendant company is subject 
to the business license tax under the provisions of section 
21.166 of the I.JOS Angeles tax ordinance as here construed 
but that the city's cause of action to recover such tax for the 
year 1948 is barred . 
. Judgment reversed. 
Shenk, Edmonds, J., 'l'raynor, .J., Spence, J., and Bray, 
,J. pro tem.,* concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. It is my view that the opinion 
prepared for the District Court of Appeal (reported at (Cal. 
·*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
May 1954] RIAVE v. CoMMITTEE OF BAR ExAMINERS 835 
[42 C.2d 835; 271 P.2d ll 
App.) 260 P.2d 217), authored Justice Fox and con-
curred in by Presiding ,Justice Moore and Justice McComb, 
adequately discusses and correctly resolves the issues which 
are presented on this appeal. For the reasons therein stated, 
I would affirm the judgment. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied June 
23, 1954. Schauer, J., was of the opinion that the 
should be granted. 
[S. F. No. 18759. In Bank. May 27, 1954.] 
LIONEL L. RIA VE, Petitioner, v. THE COMMITTEE OF 
BAR EXAMINERS et al., Respondents. 
[1] Evidence-Judicial Notice.-It is a matter of common knowl-
edge that, immediately after commencement of hostilities in 
Korea, many veterans of vVorld War II serving in reserve com-
ponents were recalled to active service in that conflict. 
[2] Attorneys-Admission to Bar-Eligibility.-Apparent purpose 
of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6060.8, excusing requirement of final 
bar examination where applieant for admission to practice, 
after graduation from accredited law school and prior to next 
final bar examination, shall have "entered upon active duty in 
the armed forces during a period of hostilities between the 
United States and any other nation," was to benefit those 
veterans whose law study was interrupted by recall to military 
service for extended periods made necessary by national emer-
gency resulting from K.orean hostilities, and such purpose does 
not contemplate annual short tours of duty for training, as 
required of reserve officers. 
PROCEEDING to review determination of Committee of 
Bar Examiners denying an application for admission to prac-
tice law without examination. Petition denied. 
Morse Erskine for Petitioner. 
Jerold E. \Veil, Morrison, Hohfeld, Foerster, Shuman & 
Clark and Richard J. Archer for Respondents. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 40. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Evidence,§ 18; [2] Attorneys,§ 13. 
